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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Plaintiff/Appellee, ] 
v. ] 
RICHARD WARREN PEARSON, ; 
Defendant/Appellant. ' 
) APPELLANT'S OPENING 
) BRIEF 
) Case no. 20041096 - CA 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court obtains jurisdiction to consider the instant appeal pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. §78-2a-3(2)(e). Defendant was convicted of the following counts 
before the Honorable Dennis Fredrick, Third District Court, State of Utah: three 
counts of Misuse of Public Money, second degree felonies; one count of Theft, a 
second degree felony; and one count of Communications Fraud, a second degree 
felony. (R. at 02-03). The Honorable Dennis Fredrick denied Appellant's request 
for a restitution hearing, which was filed and entered on the court's docket on 
November 16, 2004. A notice of appeal was timely filed on December 16, 2004. 
ISSUES, STANDARDS OF REVIEW, AND PRESERVATION 
Issue 1: Whether the district court erred in denying Defendant's request for 
a restitution hearing where a hearing was requested at sentencing and where, at 
sentencing, the trial court indicated that a hearing would be held if the parties were 
unable to negotiate an agreement. 
Standard of Review: An appellate court will normally not disturb a trial 
court's restitution order unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. However, the issue as to whether the pertinent 
statute required the trial court to hold a hearing presents a question of law, which 
is reviewed for correctness. State v. Breeze, 2001 UT App 200, \ 5, 29 P.3d 19, 21 
(UtahApp. 2001). 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at the sentencing hearing where 
Clark Harms, counsel for the State, requested a restitution hearing on behalf of 
both parties due to a continuing disagreement concerning the amount of restitution 
due. Defense counsel effectively joined in this request. (Sentencing Transcript 
from February 20, 2004 at 5). 
Issue 2: Whether a restitution hearing is otherwise required where the trial 
court failed to state on the record its reasons for the restitution order as required by 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302. 
Standard of Review: An appellate court will normally not disturb a trial 
court's restitution order unless it exceeds that prescribed by law or otherwise 
constitutes an abuse of discretion. However, the issue as to whether the pertinent 
statute required the trial court to state its reasons for the restitution amount on the 
record is a question of law, which is reviewed for correctness. Id. 
Preservation: This issue was preserved at the sentencing hearing when the 
court indicated, in response to counsel's concerns, that it would inquire into all 
claims as to the determination of restitution at a separate restitution hearing if the 
parties failed to negotiate a resolution as to the amount due. (Sentencing 
Transcript from February 20, 2004 at 7). 
TEXT OF RELEVANT STATUTE 
The following relevant constitutional provisions, statutes and rules are 
referred to in Appellant's Brief and are reproduced at Addendum A: Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-302. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. Nature of the Case 
On October 8, 2003, an information was filed wherein the Appellant, 
Richard Pearson, was charged with three counts of Misuse of Public Money, 
second degree felonies, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-8-402(2); one count 
of Theft, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-6-404; and 
one count of Communications Fraud, a second degree felony, in violation of Utah 
Code Ann. § 76-10-1801(1). (R. at 002-003). 
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B. Disposition in Trial Court 
On December 19, 2003, Mr. Pearson entered guilty pleas to the 
aforementioned charges. (R. at 32). He was sentenced on February 20, 2004, to 
five consecutive one to fifteen year prison terms. (R. at 49). However, the prison 
terms were suspended and Mr. Pearson was placed on probation for 36 months. 
(R. at 50). As part of his probation, Mr. Pearson was ordered to serve 150 days in 
the Salt Lake County Jail, attend cognitive restructuring classes by AP&P, was 
prohibited from obtaining employment in a position of financial trust, and was 
disqualified from holding any public office for the remainder of his life. 
In addition, Mr. Pearson was ordered to pay restitution in the amount of 
$131,541.13. (R. at 50). During the sentencing hearing, both parties contested the 
restitution amount, explained that the figure was inaccurate, and requested a 
restitution hearing. (Sent. Trans, at 5). 
C Course of Proceedings 
At the sentencing hearing on February 20, 2004, in response to counsel's 
request for a restitution hearing, the court instructed both parties to continue 
negotiations and, if possible, agree on an acceptable amount for restitution. (Sent. 
Trans, at 7). In the event the parties could not agree on an amount, Mr. Pearson 
was instructed to notify the court and it would schedule a restitution hearing where 
a full hearing to determine the amount of restitution would be conducted. (Sent. 
Trans, at 7). When an agreement could not be reached, on September 8, 2004, 
Appellant filed a motion requesting the trial court to hold a restitution hearing. (R. 
4 
at 55). On November 16, 2004, the District Court filed an order denying 
Appellant's request for a restitution hearing. (R. at 69). 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
INTRODUCTION 
The following facts will demonstrate that on February 20, 2004, the State 
and Mr. Pearson recognized and explained to the court that they both disputed the 
restitution figure derived by AP&P. Neither party considered the figure to be 
accurate. Consequently, a restitution hearing was requested in order to determine 
the appropriate amount. The court instructed the parties to attempt to negotiate a 
resolution and promised a restitution hearing should the parties reach impasse in 
negotiations. Subsequently, when negotiations failed, Mr. Pearson filed a motion 
requesting a restitution hearing; however, the court denied the motion and declined 
to take any evidence regarding the appropriate amount. As a result, Mr. Pearson 
has been forced to pay restitution in excess of that required by Utah Code Ann. § 
77-38a-302. 
THE UNDERLYING ALLEGATIONS 
Before the subject case arose, Mr. Pearson was an employee of the 
Department of Alcoholic Beverage Control (DABC). (R. at 4). In his position 
with DABC he was charged with the oversight of various department finances and 
was authorized to sign checks on some DABC accounts. (R. at 4). On or about 
March 13, 2003, an anonymous informant telephoned the State Bureau of 
Investigation and alleged that Mr. Pearson had diverted DABC funds for private 
use. (R. at 4). As a result, the State Bureau of Investigation began to investigate 
Mr. Pearson's involvement with DABC. (R. at 4). During the course of the 
investigation, the State Bureau of Investigation concluded that Mr. Pearson had 
used DABC funds for "both legitimate and illegitimate" purposes. (R. at 4). 
Specifically, the agency believed Mr. Pearson had used DABC funds to set up a 
legitimate petty-cash or "slush fund" of sorts but used some of the money for 
illegitimate purposes such as paying for Sparta United Soccer uniforms and 
equipment. However, the fund was also used to fund an employee gym at DABC, 
to purchase candy for machines located in DABC's office, and to provide 
unofficial employee Christmas funds and bonuses. (R. at 4). 
Mr. Pearson was subsequently charged regarding the misuse and 
mismanagement of public monies in his position with DABC. (R. at 2-3). On 
October 8, 2003, an information was filed charging Mr. Pearson as follows: Count 
I, Misuse of Public Money; Count [I, Theft; Count III, Misuse of Public Money; 
Count IV, Communications Fraud; and Count V, Misuse of Public Money. (R. at 
2-3). On December 19, 2003, he pled guilty to these charges. (Change of Plea 
Transcript from December 19, 2003 at 6-7). 
During the change of plea hearing, Mr. Pearson's Attorney, Mr. Thomas 
Rasmussen, and Counsel for the State, Ms. Anne Cameron, discussed the issue of 
restitution with the court. (Plea Trans, at 11-12.) Specifically, Mr. Rasmussen 
recognized that the amount of restitution requested by the State, over $131,541.13, 
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appeared to be inordinately high and he was currently working with Ms. Cameron 
to determine a more accurate restitution amount. (Plea Trans, at 12). As a result, 
the court continued sentencing until February 20, 2004, in part to give Mr. 
Rasmussen and Ms. Cameron adequate time to calculate a more accurate figure. 
(Plea Trans, at 13). 
THE REQUEST AT SENTENCING 
On February 20, 2004, Mr. Pearson was sentenced regarding the 
aforementioned charges; Clark Harms represented the State on behalf of Ms. 
Cameron; Mr. Rasmussen represented Mr. Pearson. (Sent. Trans, at 2). At this 
hearing, the court recognized that the office of Adult Probation and Parole had 
estimated the amount of restitution to be $131,541.13. (Sent. Trans, at 5) Mr. 
Harms indicated that the State would be seeking an additional $60,649 in 
restitution beyond that estimate. (Sent. Trans, at 5). However, Mr. Harms also 
conceded that $76,000 included in that estimate went to the benefit of DABC and 
he was "not quite sure how to deal with that." He further stated, "your Honor's 
going to have to decide [the disagreement over the restitution amount] at the 
restitution hearing." (Sent. Trans, at 5). Mr. Harms also explained that Mr. 
Pearson was contesting the restitution amount because he believed the actual 
amount was much lower. (Sent. Trans, at 5). 
Due to the disagreement of both parties concerning the accurate amount of 
restitution, Mr. Harms stated, "we'd be asking the court to set a restitution 
hearing." (Sent. Trans, at 5). Consequently, the court initially set restitution in the 
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amount of $131,541.14, "until such time and if that number is modified by this 
Court." (Sent Trans, at 6). Furthermore, the court recognized, "that leaves open 
the potential for negotiation between [Mr. Pearson's] attorney and those at the 
State who do have knowledge about what their records reflect. If there is no 
satisfactory conclusion by either party, then you're to notify this Court... and I 
will set the matter for an evidentiary hearing." (Sent. Trans, at 7). The court also 
stated that, at the restitution hearing, "all of the claims will be inquired into and a 
determination will be made." (Sent. Trans, at 7). 
THE COURT'S DENIAL OF HEARING REQUEST 
The parties never reached an agreement as to the amount of restitution and 
Mr. Rasmussen withdrew as counsel for Mr. Pearson on July 22, 2004. (R. at 54). 
On September 8, 2004, John Hutchison filed an appearance of counsel with the 
court. (R. at 55). Since the parties had been unable to determine a mutually 
acceptable restitution figure, Mr. Hutchison, pursuant to the court's prior 
instruction, filed a motion requesting a restitution hearing. (R. at 5). Ms. 
Cameron objected to the hearing and took the erroneous position that a request for 
a hearing was never made at the time of sentencing; however Ms. Cameron was 
not present at that hearing. (R. at 57; Sent. Trans, at 2). In addition, the State 
alleged that the pre-sentence report made a sufficient determination of restitution 
and that the court was authorized to rely on the report. (R. at 58). The court 
scheduled oral arguments to discuss the need for a restitution hearing on October 
8, 2004; however, that hearing was continued. (Restitution Hearing Transcript I 
ft 
on October 8, 2004 at 3). The hearing was rescheduled for the next available date, 
November 5, 2004. (Rest. Hear. Trans. I at 3). 
On November 5, 2004, Mr. Hutchison and Ms. Cameron appeared before 
the court to discuss Mr. Pearson's motion for a restitution hearing. (Restitution 
Hearing Transcript II on November 5, 2004). At the hearing, Mr. Hutchison 
reiterated that a restitution hearing was necessary. (Rest. Hear. Trans. II at 4). 
Furthermore, he argued that there were no other time limits dictating when the 
restitution hearing should be scheduled. (Rest. Hear. Trans. II at 2-3). Mr. 
Hutchison also illuminated the discrepancies with the current restitution figure and 
indicated that Mr. Pearson needed an opportunity to present those discrepancies to 
the court and have them considered. AP&P had erroneously included costs 
incurred to buy Gym equipment and office supplies that DABC used and currently 
possessed. Many of these expenditures were authorized and legitimate but were 
erroneously included as restitution nonetheless. (Rest. Hear. Trans. II at 4). 
Finally, Mr. Hutchison reminded the court that Mr. Pearson was asking for this 
restitution hearing pursuant to the court's order. (Rest. Hear. Trans. II at 5). 
After taking the matter under advisement, on November 16, 2004, the Court 
denied Mr. Pearson's motion for a restitution hearing and he was not given an 
opportunity to present evidence regarding the proper calculation of restitution. (R. 
at 69). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-302(4) requires the court to hold a restitution 
hearing whenever a defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of 
the restitution. In the instant case, Mr. Pearson requested a restitution hearing 
during sentencing because he objected to the amount of restitution. Mr. Pearson 
argued at sentencing that the actual amount of restitution was much lower than 
$131,541.13 and he desired an opportunity to present this argument to the court. 
Consequently, Mr. Pearson, relying on Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4), objected 
to the amount of restitution during his sentencing hearing and the trial court erred 
when it denied Mr. Pearson the restitution hearing to which he was entitled. 
Moreover, the State also explained that the figure was inaccurate and likely 
included purchases that appeared to be legitimate. In response to the fact that both 
parties disputed the amount of restitution, the court specifically instructed the 
parties to attempt to negotiate a resolution. The court stated unequivocally that a 
restitution hearing should be requested and held if negotiations failed. However, 
the court erroneously denied Mr. Pearson's request, which was made in 
accordance with the procedure set forth by the court. 
Furthermore, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(3) requires the court to make 
the reasons by which it determined the restitution amount part of the court record. 
In the instant case, the trial court did not indicate on the record any reasons 
regarding how it determined the amount of restitution to be $131,541.13. The 
court did not put any reasons on the record during the sentencing hearing and 
indicated that if the parties could not agree on a restitution amount a complete 
record would be made during the restitution hearing. The Court, in effect, 
recognized that the figure was inaccurate. Both parties told the court that the 
figure was inaccurate. In this regard, where the court knew the figure to be 
inaccurate, it temporarily imposed an arguably arbitrary figure pending 
negotiations. Consequently, the trial court erred when it later declined to hold the 
restitution hearing and never made the reasons by which it determined the amount 
of restitution part of the court record. 
ARGUMENT 
I. THE DISTRICT COURT WAS REQUIRED TO HOLD A 
RESTITUTION HEARING PURSUANT TO UTAH CODE 
ANN. § 77-38a-302 WHEN A RESTITUTION HEARING 
WAS REQUESTED AT SENTENCING AND WHERE THE 
SENTENCING COURT INDICATED A HEARING 
WOULD BE HELD IF THE PARTIES COULD NOT 
NEGOTIATE A RESOLUTION. 
In this case, both Mr. Pearson and the State disagreed with the amount of 
restitution determined by AP&P. Both parties told the court, at sentencing, that 
the figure was inaccurate. Both parties indicated that a restitution hearing was 
necessary. In response, the court instructed the parties to attempt to negotiate a 
resolution but promised a restitution hearing if negotiations were unproductive. 
However, when negotiations failed and a hearing was requested, the court refused 
to hold the previously promised hearing. Where the court set forth a procedure to 
determine restitution and then failed to follow that procedure, Defendant was 
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denied the opportunity to challenge the figure that both parties previously stated 
was inaccurate. 
Restitution is governed by the Crime Victims Restitution Act. Utah Code 
Ann. § 77-38a-101. Specifically, Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 provides criteria 
for a court to follow when determining a restitution amount. The statute states, in 
pertinent part, "If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution 
of the restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a 
full hearing on the issue." Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4); State v. Weeks, 458 
Utah Adv. Rep. 3, \\2, 61 P.3d 1000, 1007 (Utah 2002)(emphasis added). In 
State v. Weeks, 2000 UT App 273, 12 P.3d 110, this court reiterated that "[i]t is 
proper for the trial court to impose restitution at sentencing unless defendant 
objects to its imposition and requests a full hearing on the amount at that time." 
Id. at f9, 113; See also State v. Breeze, 2001 UT App 200, Tf6; 29 P.3d 19, 21 
(Utah App. 2001). 
However, where the defendant requests a restitution hearing, it is reversible 
error for the court to fail to hold such a hearing. State v. Haga, 954 P.2d 1284, 
1289 (Utah App. 1998). The language of § 77-38a-302(4) is "unambiguous and 
unconditional" in that regard. Breeze, 2001 UT App at |10; 29 P.3d at 22. If a 
defendant objects to a restitution amount at or before the sentencing hearing, the 
trial court must allow the defendant a full hearing on the issue. Id. (emphasis 
added). 
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In the instant case, Mr. Pearson objected to the amount of restitution that 
the trial court imposed on him during his sentencing hearing. Clark Harms, 
representing the State, even initially raised the issue and specifically noted Mr. 
Pearson's dispute over the restitution amount and then stated, "we'd be asking the 
Court to set a restitution hearing." Both parties effectively joined in this request, 
hence Mr. Harm's use of the word "we." Consequently, the language of Utah 
Code Ann. § 77-38(a)-302(4) required the trial court to hold a restitution hearing 
pursuant to Mr. Pearson's request. 
The word "shall" is presumed to indicate mandatory compliance and has 
been interpreted as such in this and other jurisdictions. Moore v. Schwendiman, 75 
P.2d 204, 207 (Utah App. 1988). Therefore, the statute made it mandatory for the 
trial court to hold a restitution hearing at Mr. Pearson's request. Consequently, 
when Mr. Pearson requested a restitution hearing so that he could present 
mitigating evidence concerning the amount of restitution owed, the trial court was 
obligated to schedule a hearing and did not have the authority to decline to hold 
such hearing. 
Furthermore, at the time the request was made, the trial court recognized 
Mr. Pearson's objection to the amount of restitution and indicated that a restitution 
hearing was available for him. The trial court expressed its preference for the 
matter to be resolved through continued negotiations and without a hearing; 
however, it recognized that an evidentiary hearing may be required, stating, "[i]f 
there is no satisfactory conclusion by either party, then you're to notify this 
Court... and I will set the matter for an evidentiary hearing." (Sent. Trans, at 7). 
Despite Mr. Pearson's request for a restitution hearing and the court's 
indication that it would comply with that request, no restitution hearing was held. 
As a result, Mr. Pearson was denied his statutory right to present mitigating 
evidence as to the amount of restitution owed. 
In the State's motion in opposition to the requested restitution hearing, Ms. 
Cameron unintentionally misrepresented the facts from the sentencing hearing. In 
her motion in opposition to Mr. Pearson's request for a restitution hearing, Ms. 
Cameron indicated, "[t]he defendant's motion was not made nor was the issue 
raised at the defendant's sentencing on February 20, 2004, as it should have been 
according to § 77-3 8(a)-302(4) of the Utah Code." The sentencing transcript 
clearly shows the issue was raised at the sentencing hearing when Mr. Harms 
specifically noted Mr. Pearson's dispute over the restitution amount and then 
stated, "we'd be asking the Court to set a restitution hearing." (Sent. Trans, at 5). 
Unfortunately, Ms. Cameron was not present at the sentencing hearing and 
she was evidently not made aware that this request was made. Consequently, her 
misrepresentation to the trial court that no request had been made was likely an 
oversight. Nonetheless, where the sentencing transcript clearly shows a request 
was made, the State's misrepresentaition of the facts is not a legitimate reason for 
the court to deny Mr. Pearson the hearing that he is statutorily entitled to have. 
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In addition, the fact that Mr. Pearson waited seven months before he 
renewed his request for the restitution hearing is likewise not a legitimate reason 
to deny him said hearing. The court never indicated a time limit within which Mr. 
Pearson was required to request the restitution hearing. Instead, the court made 
clear at sentencing that negotiations were to continue and a hearing would be held 
in the event that a resolution could not be reached. (Sent. Trans, at 7). 
Consequently, at the trial court's instruction, Mr. Pearson initially attempted to 
resolve the matter through negotiations. Unfortunately, Mr. Pearson was in jail for 
a substantial amount of that time, which offered challenges regarding his 
communication with counsel and with the State. However, when it was clear that 
negotiations between Mr. Pearson and the State were not going to produce a 
mutually amicable result, Mr. Pearson renewed his request for the restitution 
hearing pursuant to the trial court's instructions. 
However, the trial court declined to hold the restitution hearing, stating in 
part that the request was not made until seven months after the sentencing. 
However, as stated earlier, it was on the trial court's instruction, that Mr. Pearson 
waited several months in attempts to reach an agreement with the state. 
Consequently, where the court chose not to immediately schedule a restitution 
hearing and instead instructed the parties to negotiate and then to notify the court 
in the event a hearing was necessary, it was obligated to conduct that hearing even 
seven months later. The court did not give any guidelines regarding a time frame 
within which Mr. Pearson was obligated to reassert his right to the restitution 
IS 
hearing, nor does the statute contain a time frame within which the hearing must 
be scheduled. 
Furthermore, since the time Mr. Pearson was denied his right to the 
restitution hearing, the Utah Legislature has amended the pertinent statute to 
explicitly authorize the court to conduct a restitution hearing up to one year after 
the request is made. Utah S. 94, S.B. 94, 2005 Gen. Sess. (March 11, 2005). This 
demonstrates that the seven-month period was not unreasonable. The Legislature 
recognized that it is often difficult to determine restitution and, consequently, it 
recognized that it is reasonable for the trial court to conduct the restitution hearing 
up to one year after the original request is made. Utah H., Floor Debate on Utah 
Senate Bill 94 on the floor of the House, session law chapter 96 (Feb. 9, 




In conclusion, where Mr. Pearson requested a restitution hearing at 
sentencing, the trial court is statutorily required to hold the hearing. The fact that 
Ms. Cameron incorrectly informed the court that no request had been made, nor 
the fact that seven months had passed before the hearing was officially scheduled 
are legitimate reasons to deny Mr. Pearson his statutory right to a restitution 
hearing. The amount of restitution was highly contested and Mr. Pearson had 
compelling reasons as to why the amount of restitution should have been lower 
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than the amount proposed by AP&P. Consequently, this Court should remand the 
case back to the trial court where it should be instructed to conduct a restitution 
hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4). 
II. THE DISTRICT COURT ERRED WHEN IT SET THE 
RESTITUTION AMOUNT FOR MR. PEARSON 
WITHOUT CONSIDERING ANY OF THE REQUIRED 
FACTORS OR STATING ITS REASONS FOR THE 
RESTITUTION AMOUNT ON THE RECORD. 
The Legislature has given trial courts the authority to order a defendant to 
pay restitution. Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-301. However, before the sentencing 
court may impose restitution, it must consider specific factors, such as the cost of 
the damage or loss of property, the financial resources of the defendant, the 
rehabilitative effect of requirement to pay restitution, etc. Utah Code Ann. § 77-
38a-302(5)(b)(c). The language of the Code does not require the sentencing court 
to explicitly note on the record each of the factors listed in the aforementioned 
subsections; however, it does require the court consider each factor and then 
"make the reasons [for its restitution] decision part of the court record." State v. 
Smith, 475 Utah Adv. Rep. 3, %L9, 72 P.3d 692, 701 (Utah App. 2003); Weeks, 458 
Utah Adv. Rep. at ^22, 61 P.3d at 1006; State v. Haston, 811 P.2d 929, 936 (Utah 
App. 1991); Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(3)(emphasis added). 
Furthermore, if the sentencing court does not specifically list which factors 
it considered, an appellate court may assume the sentencing court considered the 
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required factors if to do so would be reasonable. Weeks, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. at 
H24, 61 P.3d at 1006-07. 
In the instant case, the trial court never made the reasons for its decision 
part of the record as required by Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(3). At the time it 
made its decision, it did not specifically mention any of the factors that it was 
required to consider by Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(c). Furthermore, it is 
not reasonable to assume that the trial court considered these factors when it 
imposed restitution. At the time restitution was imposed, the court was aware of 
the serious dispute over the amount of restitution. Both parties told the court that 
the figure derived by AP&P was inaccurate. Consequently, the court set 
restitution in an amount it knew to be inappropriate. In this regard, although the 
figure was derived by AP&P, it was derived erroneously, and the court effectively 
imposed an arbitrary figure temporarily stating that it would consider all the 
relevant factors at the restitution hearing in the event that counsel could not agree 
on an accurate figure.1 (Sent. Trans, at 7). 
Furthermore, in the instant case the trial court was not authorized to rely on 
the amount determined by AP&P and is distinguished from Weeks, 61 P.3d 1000, 
for several key reasons. In Weeks, the sentencing court held a restitution hearing 
to determine the amount of restitution owed by the defendant. At that hearing, the 
defendant did not present any evidence to rebut the restitution amount suggested 
1
 The amount determined by the court was arbitrary because both Mr. Pearson and the State disagreed with 
the figure the court used and the court had not heard arguments to help it determine which amount was 
accurate. 
IS 
by the state. Consequently, the court determined the restitution amount and stated 
on the record, "[g]iven what I have reviewed, that being the presentence report, as 
well as the orders in the matter, as well as now having heard arguments of counsel, 
I [am] persuaded that ... the numbers I have ordered as restitution [are] fair and 
reasonable." Weeks, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. at [^6, 61 P.3d at 1002. The defendant 
challenged the restitution order on the grounds that the trial court "failed to 
reference on the record each factor listed in [Utah Code Ann. § 77-3 8a-
302(5)(b)(c)]." 
In dicta, the court noted that the sentencing court does not need to address 
each factor on the record; it only needs to consider each factor and then make 
those that it relied on part of the record. Id. at f23, 1006. Furthermore the court 
held that, where the sentencing court does not make the factors part of the record, 
an appellate court is permitted to assume the sentencing court considered the 
factors set forth in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(c) if to do so would be 
reasonable. 
First, in the instant case, Mr. Pearson never had an opportunity to present 
evidence to challenge the restitution amount determined by AP&P. This 
information is usually contested at a restitution hearing, and Mr. Pearson was 
never afforded this hearing. See State v. Corbitt, 2003 UT App 417, 82 P.3d 211 
(Utah App. 2003). In Weeks, the sentencing court specifically recognized a 
defendant's right to challenge the figures cited in the presentence report and relied 
1Q 
upon by the State. Weeks, 458 Utah Adv. Rep. at [^20, 61 P.3d at 1005. However, 
because no hearing has been held, Mr. Pearson was not afforded this opportunity. 
Second, in the instant case, the sentencing court did not reference any of the 
factors listed in Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(5)(b)(c). Nor did it even indicate 
that it had considered any of these factors when it set the restitution amount. In 
actuality, the sentencing court effectively indicated that it had not considered any 
of the relevant factors when it indicated that "all of the claims" would be inquired 
into at the restitution hearing. (Sent. Trans, at 7). Consequently, the court did not 
list any of the factors on which it relied nor did it indicate that it had considered 
the factors. 
Third, in the instant case, it is not reasonable to assume that the sentencing 
court considered the required factors. There was no trial conducted in the instant 
case, the guilty verdict was reached through a plea. Consequently, the court did 
not hear testimony surrounding the alleged charges and monetary losses. 
Furthermore, at the time restitution was discussed, both parties considered the 
figure inaccurate and indicated that a restitution hearing might be necessary. (See 
Sent. Trans, at 5). Finally, as mentioned earlier, the court explained that all of the 
claims surrounding the dispute over the restitution amount would be considered at 
the restitution hearing in the event the parties could not agree on an accurate 
figure. Therefore, it is not reasonable to assume that the court considered all the 
factors before setting the restitution amount in the instant case. 
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It should also be noted that Mr. Pearson vehemently contests the restitution 
amount reached by AP&P. DABC retained the use and possession of many items 
that were considered by AP&P when it calculated its restitution figure for Mr. 
Pearson. Moreover, many items purchased were purchased legitimately. As a 
result, those items that DABC retained should not be considered a "loss" that was 
suffered as a result of Mr. Pearson's actions. For example, where Mr. Pearson 
bought workout equipment to create a gym for the employees of DABC, as he was 
authorized to do, and DABC still has possession of that equipment and allows its 
employees to use and benefit from that possession, the gym equipment should not 
be considered a "loss" that DABC suffered. However, in the instant case, Mr. 
Pearson was never given a restitution hearing, and, consequently, never given an 
opportunity to present this and much additional information to the court. As a 
result, appellate review of the restitution order, to determine if the amount is 
reasonable, is impossible where no insight into the court's rationale is discernible 
from the record. 
In conclusion, the trial court erred when it failed to state on the record the 
reasons by which it determined Mr. Pearson's restitution. Consequently, Mr. 
Pearson cannot adequately challenge the findings where the reasoning of the court 
is absent from the record. As a result, this Court should remand the case back to 
the trial court to conduct a restitution hearing pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-
38a-302(4) where it can properly consider all of the factors required by Utah Code 
01 
Ann. § 77-28a-302(5)(b)(c) and slate the reasons by which it determines the 
restitution amount on the record. 
A. This issue was preserved at sentencing when the trial court 
indicated that it would inquire into all the claims at the 
restitution hearing. 
As a general rule, a claim must be preserved before the trial court or it may 
not be raised on appeal. State v. Cram, 2002 UT 37, \% 46 P.3d 230, 232 (Utah 
2002). However, an appellate court may hear a claim that was not properly 
preserved through objection where 1he trial court considered the issue sua sponte. 
State v. Jaegar, 973 P.2d 404, 208 FN 4 (Utah 1999). There are two major policy 
considerations supporting the preservation requirement: (1) to give the trial court 
an opportunity to address the claimed error, and, if appropriate, correct it; and (2) 
to prevent a defendant from omitting an objection in hopes of an acquittal and 
then, when that strategy fails, claiming on appeal that the appellate court should 
reverse, /rf. at Tf 10, 323-33. 
In the instant case, the trial court recognized that it had not considered all of 
the information surrounding the restitution amount. The Court further stated that 
any and all of those issues would be addressed at the restitution hearing. 
Consequently, it noted the objections to the amount and determination of 
restitution sua sponte and then it determined that those issues would be considered 
at a later date. The court later declined to grant the promised restitution hearing. 
However, the issue was sufficiently preserved when the trial court recognized, sua 
sponte, that both parties disagreed with the amount of restitution and it knew the 
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parties would need the court to make specific findings as to how it determined 
restitution. 
Furthermore, both policy reasons for the requirement of preservation are 
satisfied in the instant case. First, the trial court was on notice that it needed to 
make the reasons for its restitution decision part of the record because it raised the 
issue sua sponte and indicated it would do so during the restitution hearing. 
Second, this was not an attempt by the defendant to forgo an objection in an 
attempt to get a later reversal. The trial court indicated it would put the necessary 
findings on the record at the restitution hearing and Mr. Pearson had no reason to 
suspect that the trial court would decline to hold the hearing. Consequently, 
policy reasons weigh in favor of finding this issue was preserved. 
B. In the alternative, it was plain error for the court to 
fail to indicate on the record the reasons by which it 
determined the restitution amount, where it was not 
reasonable to assume the court had considered the 
required factors. 
Generally, a defendant who fails to bring an issue before the trial court is 
barred from asserting it initially on appeal. State v. Archambeau, 820 P.2d 920, 
922 (Utah App. 1991). However, a well-established exception to this rule applies 
when the trial court committed "plain error". "Plain error" exists when (1) the 
error is "plain", in other words, the error should have been obvious to the trial 
court that it was committing error; and (2) the error affected the substantial rights 
of the accused, in other words, the error was harmful. Id. 
I T 
First, the error should have been obvious to the trial court. The trial court 
specifically recognized that, if the parties couldn't reach an agreement, then a 
restitution hearing would be necessary to determine "all claims" surrounding the 
restitution amount. Therefore, the court recognized, at the sentencing hearing, the 
need to put the factors on the record. However, it refused to hold the restitution 
hearing in order to do so. The statute and case law are clear that the court must 
consider all required statutory factors, and it must then put the reasons for its 
decision on the record. See generally Utah Code Ann. 77-38a-302. Consequently, 
the trial court was aware of its statutory requirements, and it verbally recognized 
the need to accomplish these requirements; therefore, when the trial court failed to 
indicate on the record the reason as to how it determined Mr. Pearson's restitution 
amount, it committed "plain error." 
Second, the error affected the substantial rights of Mr. Pearson. Mr. 
Pearson had legitimate information to present to the court, wrhich would have 
shown the amount of restitution to be much less than that initially suggested in the 
presentence report. Consequently, when the trial court did not explain the reasons 
by which it determined the restitution, it has severely impaired Mr. Pearson's right 
to contest the amount. Mr. Pearson is entitled to appeal an unjust and unfounded 
restitution order; however, when the court fails to put on the record the reasons by 
which it determined the amount of restitution, it becomes impossible for the 
defendant to contest the amount. Haston, 811 P.2d at 937. Therefore, the trial 
court's failure to explain on the record the reasons by which it determined the 
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amount of restitution affected his substantial right to an appeal regarding that 
determination and was also harmful to him insomuch that he is being forced to pay 
a restitution amount that is likely much higher than that which the statute 
authorizes. 
In conclusion, the issue was preserved when the trial court recognized that 
there was a need to have the reasons for the restitution amount put on the record 
and indicated that would be done at the restitution hearing. In the alternative, if 
the issue was not sufficiently preserved, then it was plain error for the trial court to 
neglect the duties imposed on it by Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 where it was 
aware of the requirements and its failure to abide by those requirements impaired 
Mr. Pearson's substantial rights. 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, Appellant/Defendant, RICHARD PEARSON, 
respectfully asks this Court to reverse the order refusing the hearing and 
REMAND this case back to the trial court for a restitution hearing in compliance 
with Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4). 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this /ff day of April, 2005. 
PEfSfc DJafoD ALL 
Attorney for Appellant 
o^ 
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the foregoing Appellant's Opening Brief, postage prepaid, this \t> day of April, 2005, 
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ASSISTANT ATTORNEY GENERAL 
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Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-0854 
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ADDENDUM I 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302 
(1) When a defendant is convicted of criminal activity that has resulted in 
pecuniary damages, in addition to any other sentence it may impose, the court 
shall order that the defendant make restitution to victims of crime as provided in 
this chapter, or for conduct for which the defendant has agreed to make restitution 
as part of a plea disposition. For purposes of restitution, a victim has the meaning 
as defined in Subsection 77-38a-102(13) and in determining whether restitution is 
appropriate, the court shall follow the criteria and procedures as provided in 
Subsections (2) through (5). 
(2) In determining restitution, the court shall determine complete restitution and 
court-ordered restitution. 
(a) "Complete restitution" means restitution necessary to compensate a victim for 
all losses caused by the defendant. 
(b) "Court-ordered restitution" means the restitution the court having criminal 
jurisdiction orders the defendant to pay as a part of the criminal sentence at the 
time of sentencing. 
(c) Complete restitution and court-ordered restitution shall be determined as 
provided in Subsection (5). 
(3) If the court determines that restitution is appropriate or inappropriate under 
this part, the court shall make the reasons for the decision part of the court record. 
(4) If the defendant objects to the imposition, amount, or distribution of the 
restitution, the court shall at the time of sentencing allow the defendant a full 
hearing on the issue. 
(5)(a) For the purpose of determining restitution for an offense, the offense shall 
include any criminal conduct admitted by the defendant to the sentencing court or 
to which the defendant agrees to pay restitution. A victim of an offense that 
involves as an element a scheme, a conspiracy, or a pattern of criminal activity, 
includes any person directly harmed by the defendant's criminal conduct in the 
course of the scheme, conspiracy, or pattern. 
(b) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for complete 
restitution, the court shall consider all relevant facts, including: 
(i) the cost of the damage or loss if the offense resulted in damage to or loss or 
destruction of property of a victim of the offense; 
(ii) the cost of necessary medical and related professional services and devices 
relating to physical or mental health care, including nonmedical care and 
treatment rendered in accordance with a method of healing recognized by the law 
of the place of treatment; 
(iii) the cost of necessary physical and occupational therapy and rehabilitation; 
(iv) the income lost by the victim as a result of the offense if the offense resulted 
in bodily injury to a victim; 
(v) up to five days of the individual victim's determinable wages that are lost due 
to theft of or damage to tools or equipment items of a trade that were owned by 
the victim and were essential to the victim's current employment at the time of the 
offense; and 
(vi) the cost of necessary funeral and related services if the offense resulted in the 
death of a victim. 
(c) In determining the monetary sum and other conditions for court-ordered 
restitution, the court shall consider the factors listed in Subsections (5)(a) and (b) 
and: 
(i) the financial resources of the defendant and the burden that payment of 
restitution will impose, with regard to the other obligations of the defendant; 
(ii) the ability of the defendant to pay restitution on an installment basis or on 
other conditions to be fixed by the court; 
(iii) the rehabilitative effect on the defendant of the payment of restitution and the 
method of payment; and 
(iv) other circumstances which the court determines may make restitution 
inappropriate. 
(d) The court may decline to make an order or may defer entering an order of 
restitution if the court determines that the complication and prolongation of the 
sentencing process, as a result of considering an order of restitution under this 
Subsection (5), substantially outweighs the need to provide restitution to the 
victim. 
Laws 2001. c. 137. § 8. eff. April 30. 2001; Laws 2002. c. 35. § 13. eff. May 6. 
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT 
OF SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
RICHARD WARREN PEARSON, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF ENTRY OF APPEARANCE 
AS COUNSEL, MOTION FOR 
RESTITUTION HEARING AND 
REQUEST FOR DISCOVERY 
Case No. 031906848 
Comes now, John Blair Hutchison, Attorney at Law, who hereby enters his appearance as 
counsel for the defendant in the above-entitled matter upon the charges of: THREE (3) 
COUNTS OF MISUSE OF PUBLIC MONEY, THEFT and COMMUNICATIONS FRAUD and 
further, requests a Restitution Hearing on behalf of said defendant. Pursuant to Rule 16, Utah 
Rules of Criminal Procedure, the prosecutor is requested to furnish documentation as to how 
the Restitution a"mount of $131,541.13 was calculated that the defendant has beert Ordered to 
pay. 
DATED this 8th day of September 2004. 
0/Ci^/yLcnJu^ 6TT—» 
JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON 
Attorney for Defendant 
State v. Pearson 
CaseNa.031906848 
Entry of Appearance and Motion for 
Restitution Hearing and Discovery 
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I hereby certify that I faxed and/or mailed, postage prepaid, a true and correct copy of the 
original on the 8th day of September 2004 to the following: 
Anne A. Cameron 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office 
2001 S. State #S3600 
Salt Lake City, UT 84190 
Fax: 801-468-2622 
Court Clerk Legal Assistant 
Third District Court 
450 S. State Street 
P.O. Box 1860 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL CFlttFttftfUCTCOUBT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF ufMP Judicial District 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD WARREN PIERSON, 
Defendant. 
NOV 1 6 2004 
lAtrUKI 
MINUTE ENTRY 
Case No. 031906848 
Hon. J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
November 12, 2004 
m 
vftle*' 
The above-entitled matter comes before the Court pursuant to 
Defendant's Motion for Restitution Hearing and Request for 
Discovery. The Court heard oral argument with respect to the 
Motion on November 5, 2004. Following the hearing, the matter 
was taken under advisement. The Court having considered the 
motion and memoranda, as well as the arguments of counsel, hereby 
enters the following ruling. 
Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 77-38a-302(4), Defendant's 
request is untimely as the motion was not made, nor any objection 
voiced, until seven months after the sentencing. Moreover, the 
presentence report in this case provides an accurate outline of 
the amounts misused and their destinations, and defendant had 
access to this report and the discovery which detailed the 
State's accounting. Finally, in State v. Weeks, 2002 UT 98, 61 
P. 3d 1000, the Utah Supreme Court held that restitution based 
upon the information in a presentence report is a sufficient 
basis upon which the Court may determine an order of restitution. 
In light of the forgoing, Defendant's Motion for Restitution 
Hearing and Request for Discovery is not well taken and, 
accordingly, denied., 
4 
DATED t h i s / V ^ d a y o f N o v e m b e r , 2 0 0 4 . f 
J . D 
DISTHIC 
CERTIFICATE OF NOTIFICATION 
I certify that a copy of the attached document was sent to the 
following people for case 031906848 by the method and on the date 
specified. 
METHOD NAME 
Mail ANNE A CAMERON 
ATTORNEY PLA 
111 E BROADWAY STE 400 
SALT LAKE CITY, UT 84111 
Mail JOHN BLAIR HUTCHISON 
ATTORNEY DEF 
4 27 27TH ST 
OGDEN UT 84401 
Dated this \{p day of V\.P\f > , 20£>H 
C. fahW 
Deputy Court Clerk 
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ADDENDUM V 
PETER D. GOOD ALL #9718 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
175 East 400 South, Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Telephone: (801) 355-0320 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
RICHARD WARREN PEARSON, 
Defendant. 
NOTICE OF APPEAL 
.Case No. 031906848 
: JUDGE J. DENNIS FREDERICK 
Defendant/Appellant, RICHARD WARREN PEARSON, by and through his attorney of 
record, PETER D. GOOD ALL, hereby gives notice of his intent to appeal this Honorable Court's 
ruling denying him a restitution hearing in the above captioned case. The Defendant is the party 
taking the instant appeal. The appeal will be taken from the Third District Court, the Honorable 
J. Dennis Frederick presiding. The instant appeal will be taken to the Utah Court of Appeals. 
The following issues and orders will be raised on appeal: Defendant will appeal this Court's 
order denying his request for a restitution hearing, which was filed on November 16, 2004. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this _{^_ day of December, 2004. 
YENGICH, RICH & XAIZ 
Attorneys for Defendant 
By ^ P ^ l ^ = ^ 
PETER D. GOODALL 
0«» DEC 16 PM U: 0 8 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby declare that I caused to be mailed/delivered a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Notice of Appeal, this \{$^ day of December, 2004, to the following: 
Anne A. Cameron 
Assistant District Attorney 
Salt Lake District Attorney's Office 
111 East 300 South, 4th Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Clerk of the Court 
Utah Court of Appeals 
450 South State Street, Fifth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Court Reporter for Judge Eyre 
c/o Jody Myer 
Fourth Judicial District Court 
125 North 100 West 
Provo, Utah 84601 
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